

SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Major Culmer

SECRET

MINUTES OF THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE
USCIB SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COMINT PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS
AND PRACTICES

MR. JEROME D. FENTON, OSD, CHAIRMAN

MEMBERS PRESENT:

STATE:	Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
OSD:	Mr. Jerome D. Fenton
FBI:	Mr. Bernard A. Wells
CIA:	Colonel Sheffield Edwards
NSA:	<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 250px;"></div>
ARMY:	Brigadier General H. O. Paxson
NAVY:	Rear Admiral R. H. Rice
AIR FORCE:	Brigadier General E. A. Sirmeyer, Jr.
USCIB:	Major W. R. Culmer

25X1

SECRETARY: LCDR P. J. Karl, USN

ALSO PRESENT:

OSD:	Colonel Sidney S. Rubenstein
25X1A	Mr. Robert E. Drake
CIA:	<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 250px;"></div>
ARMY:	Major James T. Babbitt
NAVY:	LCDR D. A. Davis
AIR FORCE:	Lt. Colonel Dean C. Gibbons
	Major John H. Remick

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

SECRET

SECRET

The fourth meeting of the USCIB Special Committee on COMINT Personnel Security Standards and Practices was held in room 3E1060, the Pentagon, on 7 February 1956. The Chairman explained that the purpose of the meeting was to consider the revised report of the Ad Hoc Drafting Committee prepared in accordance with the guidance furnished at the third meeting of this group.

-oOo-

The Chairman noted that the Drafting Committee had included a new section entitled "Levels of Clearance" which indicated that different levels of clearance are not only unfeasible but also unnecessary.

All members approved the new section without amendment.

-oOo-

Moving on to Recommendation # 11 (formerly # 8), the Chairman noted that this area dealt primarily with the kinship of individuals to be cleared for COMINT.

In response to a question on an interpretation of "parents," Mr. Drake stated that the drafting Committee intended that the word "parents" should be interpreted as parents of the individual to be cleared.

All members accepted this interpretation and agreed that Recommendation # 11 was acceptable without amendment.

-oOo-

Recommendation # 19 (formerly # 17) dealt with the problem of "remote control" of personnel leaving the COMINT community, the Chairman said.

All members accepted Recommendation # 19 without change.

-oOo-

The Chairman suggested that the members next consider Recommendation # 25. He explained that it provided for an annual review of existing COMINT personnel security standards and practices by the USCIB Security Committee.

All members accepted Recommendation # 25 without amendment.

-oOo-

The Chairman returned to Recommendation # 21 (formerly # 19) and indicated that the Air Force member had submitted an alternate version for consideration.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

The Air Force member explained that his alternate proposal was submitted in an effort to eliminate certain ambiguity in the drafting committee's recommendation.

The members agreed that the alternate proposal was acceptable in terms of substance and concurred in the Chairman's suggestion that it could be considered, therefore, as a substitute for the drafting committee's proposal.

The members discussed the matter at some length and ultimately agreed to accept the following revision of the Air Force member's alternate proposal:

"RECOMMENDATION # 21: It is recommended that CIBD # 5, paragraph 6 be replaced by the following:

"6. a. Individuals considered by the USCIB member concerned to occupy a particularly sensitive position shall be re-investigated at intervals not to exceed five years. Such re-investigation should include a national agency check, a review of an up-to-date personal history statement or other documentation, a check of personal, business, and neighborhood associates, police and credit check and where feasible a personal interview conducted by security or counterintelligence personnel. Individuals indicated in paragraph 3c need not be subjected to re-investigation.

"b. A particularly sensitive position is considered to include one where the incumbent has the need-to-know; and has access to particularly sophisticated or wide variety of cryptanalytic techniques, or who has a broad knowledge of U. S. COMINT resources and successes, or who may for other reasons be a more likely target of foreign intelligence services.

"c. Other individuals cleared for COMINT and retaining that status over a long period of time, not considered to occupy a particularly sensitive position, shall be subjected to such periodic re-investigations as are considered necessary by the USCIB member concerned. Such re-investigation shall be conducted so as to reasonably assure member departments and agencies that an individual continues to meet the requirements for access to COMINT."

-oOo-

The Chairman observed that the final report of this committee would be forwarded to USCIB through appropriate channels.

Mr. Drake said he thought it likely that USCIB would consider the report at its March meeting.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

The Chairman suggested that the matter of his appearing before USCIB when the report is discussed be left open for future consideration.

-oOo-

The meeting adjourned at 1100 hours.

SECRET